The real threat... Grandpa

We have Grandma being groped, kids being fondled and yet the main problems with security are not being addressed.

Its Grandpa and his medals.....

Medal Of Honor

Fails to Impress Airline Security

  by Joyce Howard Price

"They just didn't know what it was but they acted like I shouldn't be carrying it on," retired Marine Corps General Joseph J. Foss of Scottsdale, Arizona said yesterday in a telephone interview.

"I kept explaining that it was the highest medal you can receive from the military in this country, but nobody listened," he said.  Gen. Foss, an 86-year-old former South Dakota governor whose resume also includes stints as president of the National Rifle Association and as commissioner of the old American Football League, said he was "hassled" about the medal by two separate security crews at Sky Harbor International Airport in Phoenix.  He was trying to board an America West airliner January 11 to attend an NRA meeting in Arlington.

"I received the medal in 1943 from President Franklin Roosevelt," after shooting down 26 enemy planes in the Pacific, said Gen. Foss, who was a Marine fighter pilot during World War II.  "It states all that stuff on the back of the medal," he said.  "I was held up for 45 minutes, while they decided what to do about the medal.  I almost missed my flight, as they went back and forth," Gen. Foss said.

He stressed that he would not have boarded the plane if he had been stopped from taking the medal aboard.  "I'm one of only about 140 surviving Medal of Honor recipients," he said.

General Foss acknowledges that a commemorative metal nail file - also bearing a Medal of Honor inscription - and a dummy bullet were also in the same pocket of his sports coat as he military medal.  Those items were seized before he boarded the plane, but he was allowed to keep the Medal of Honor.

Metal nail files and other instruments with blades are prohibited from aircraft cabins under Federal Aviation Administration regulations that went into effect after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Bullets and other ammunition are not permitted on an aircraft in a passenger's possession.  However, the bullet taken from Gen. Foss was harmless, as it has a hole in it so that it will fit on a key chain.

An FAA spokesman was unable to say whether a dummy bullet would be banned under the federal regulations.  But he pointed out that airlines are allowed to impose restrictions that go beyond those of the federal agency.

Gen. Foss said he normally doesn't travel with his medal.  "I do not carry the medal around with me.  But I had it with me this time to show to cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point," where he was a guest speaker last week.

Patty Nowack, spokeswoman for America West, said she could not respond to specific questions about the Foss case, as she cannot verify he flew on the airline.  She could not say whether there would be any security concerns about a medal but that it would cause a metal detector to go off.

"Our primary objective is to ensure the safety and security of all passengers and employees.  We're not trying to single out any individual," she said yesterday.

Gen. Foss says he believes his one-way, first-class ticket, coupled with the 10-gallon hat and western boots he was wearing, made him seem suspicious to security personnel.  Because he wears a pacemaker, he said he couldn't go through a metal detector and so he had to be "frisked" by guards.

Also, Gen. Foss said, "I had to take off my cowboy boots three times (before boarding), as well as my belt and necktie.  I compared the situation to bailing out to land in a foreign country.

He said security personnel went so far as to remove razor blades from his luggage, which also went beyond FAA requirements.  Jim Baker, chief lobbyist for the NRA, said he understands the need for "extra security."  But he questions how an 86-year-old man bearing the Medal of Honor could be considered a security risk.

"There appears to be a need to incorporate common sense" with the additional security that's being imposed, Mr. Baker said.

Washington Times

al Qaeda attacks on the west

7/7 bombing in London

"Al-Qaeda is an international terrorist network led by Usama bin Laden [the "Osama" spelling is deprecated, because there is no letter "O" in Arabic). Established around 1988 by bin Laden, al-Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. To continue the holy war beyond Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries.

In February 1998, al-Qaeda issued a statement under banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens—civilian or military—and their allies everywhere. Al-Qaeda would merge with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad) of Ayman al-Zawahiri in June 2001."   http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm

1992  In Aden, Yemen a bombing at Gold Mohur hotel, a second bombing at a different hotel targeting US troops killed 2 Australian tourists, (Bin Laden later claimed responsibility for the 1992 Yemen attack)

1993 WTC bombing, Ramzi Yousef organized attack, 6 dead and 1000 wounded.(Osama bin Laden provided financial support to the blind sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman).

1994 Operation Bojinka, a plot to destroy airplanes in mid-Pacific flight using explosives (Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed organized), they tested the operation on flight 434.

    

November 1994 on the Philippine Airlines Flight 434, which also involved Abu Sayyaf (a Southeast Asia affiliate of Al Qaeda), and killed one passenger

1998, Al-Qaeda operatives carried out the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring more than 5,000 others

1999 and into 2000, al-Qaeda planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan

2000 planned bombing of LAX (plot was foiled when bomber Ahmed Ressam was caught at the US-Canadian border with explosives in the trunk of his car.)

2000 Al-Qaeda also planned to attack the USS The Sullivans 

2000 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia one Brit dead in three car bombing attack

2000, while at anchor in Aden, the USS Cole was attacked by Al-Qaeda suicide bombers, 17 dead and 39 wounded.

USS Cole on the back of MV Blue Marlin

2000 German police foiled a plot to bomb the Christmas market near the Strasbourg Cathedral in Strasbourg, France.

2001 series of attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. These attacks destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon in a series of suicide hijacking of airplanes. Osama bin Laden did take credit for the attacks days before the 2004 Presidential Election.

2001 Richard Ried (shoe bomber), attempted to destroy flight 63, (Al-Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef organized with British subject Saajid Muhammad Badat).

2002 Bali, Indonesia bombings, 202 dead and 240 wounded, (Jemaah Islamiah accredited and linked to al Qeada).

Bali bombing

2003 Casablanca, Morroco suicide bombings, 45 dead.

2003 Istanbul bombings were four truck bomb attacks carried out on November 15, 2003 and November 20, 2003, in Istanbul, Turkey, leaving 57 people dead, and 700 wounded.

2004 al Qeada attributed (possible ETA) but not confirmed attack on the Madrid Train, 191 dead

Madrid train bombing

2004 Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia barracks attack in, 22 dead, 25 wounded.

al Khobar barracks

2005 Four members of Al-Qaeda, three of British Pakistani descent and one of British Jamaican descent attacked Londons public transport on July 7th 2005.. Three bombs were detonated on the London Underground and one on a double decker bus. The attacks took place between 8.50am and 9.47am. 56 people died during the attacks (including 4 terrorists) and around 700 were injured.

2005 Amman, Jordan hotel bombing, 60 dead and hundred wounded.

2007 Algiers, Algeria bombing, 33 dead.

2007 Casablanca, Morroco in March and April suicide bombings 8 dead, several attacks foiled by the police.

2008 Danish embassy bombing, Pakistan, 6 dead and several injured. (Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, a high-ranking member of Al-Qaeda, issued a statement after the bombing, claiming that the attack was a response to the 2005 publication of the Muhammed Cartoons).

Danish embassy, Pakistan

2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (underwear bomber) December 25, 2009 bombing attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 , (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attack).

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab arrested

2010, two packages, each containing a bomb consisting of 300 to 400 grams (11–14 oz) of plastic explosives and a detonating mechanism, were found on separate cargo planes, (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attack)

The death of the Three Block war?

There has been talk that the death of the Three block war and the newer construct called the "whole-of-government" approach also called 3D+C (Diplomacy, Development, Defence and Commerce). 

The scene depicts current and near future anti-insurgent operations in Iraq.

"In 2005, Hillier modified the activities. He put "fighting" in block one, "helping secure, stabilize and nation build" in block two, and, most ambitiously, "helping people through disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and  peacekeeping" in block three. Later, Hillier substituted "warfighting" with "war," suggesting the combat element is sustained."

"Personnel cannot and should not be expected to serve as humanitarian workers, peacekeepers, and warfighters all at the same time, and within a small area. Combat should be separated as much as possible from other functions, which should, preferably, be done by distinct organizations, including UN agencies, police, and peacekeepers. The concept's lack of a firm intellectual foundation is also challenging, but not so much as the contradiction at its heart – warfighting cannot mix with peace support and other missions. The Three Block War exacerbates this problem by making it look tidy, simple, and easy. The result is that military forces may all-to-easily be sent to fight an unwinnable Three Block War. Instead of embracing Three Block War operations, militaries should try to avoid them."

THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE “THREE BLOCK WAR”  by Doctor A. Walter Dorn and Michael Varey    http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/07-dornvarey-eng.asWhile the experiences in Afghanistan has showcased that the original 3 D approach (also called the three block war) was flawed in concept it could also be argued that the enemy has changed the paridigm.  The Afghan war is untypical in scope and practise as it has become a global effort for both the enemy and the allies.  But what war is typical and that truly is the challenge all war thinkers face as we look to the future.

The future may be completely different and uncomfortable.

A new UN force?  MI  35 (Hind) Gunship in the Congo

Is there a place for an updated UN force that has clear rules of engagement that we use in places like Afghanistan?

Costs of military aircraft (American)

Here is a unit cost for fighters, helicopters and cargo aircraft frames.

Comparison of the super Hornet with the Hornet

Something worthy of note is the unit cost of items that some might think could be better than the JSF... the Global Hawk UAV and the F18 Super Hornet.

An RQ-4 Global Hawk taxis down the runway at Beale Air Force Base, Calif., April 8, 2010, on an operational mission. During the flight, the aircraft flew over Canadian airspace for the first time in non-training status.

US Military Aircraft: Total and Unit Costs by Program 

 

(Source: US DoD for data; defense-aerospace.com for calculations; based on Selected Acquisition Reports to December 31, 2009) (in $ millions) 

(NOTES: (1) Numbers for previous production runs (“was”) refer to previous SAR, and not necessarily to the Dec. 2006 SAR used in our previous analysis. (2) significant unit cost increases in red.)

The Canadian Military and the Governments position on the JSF

I am including two pieces on the JSF and Canada's decision to move forward with this controversial jet.

The first is the typical news article written by the forces but the second is a little more interesting as it is a report from a senate committee hearing.  In it they showcase the decision process and at time the candor of the decision.

Canada’s Next Generation Fighter: the F-35 Lightning II

July 16, 2010

A Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II test plane with multi-national paint scheme, Fort Worth, Texas. Credit: Neal Chapman © Lockheed Martin.

F-35 Lightning II piloted by Jeff 'Slim' Knowles. The F-35 Lightning II is Canada’s next generation fighter. Photo Credit: © Lockheed Martin.

F-35 Lightning IIs in flight. Photo Credit: David Drais © Lockheed Martin.

The Government of Canada today announced it is acquiring the fifth generation Joint Strike Fighter F-35 Lightning II aircraft to contribute to the modernization of the Canadian Forces, while bringing significant economic benefits and opportunities to regions across Canada.

“The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the best aircraft we can provide our men and women in uniform to face and defeat the challenges of the 21^st century,” said the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. “This multi-role stealth fighter will help the Canadian Forces defend the sovereignty of Canadian airspace, remain a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and provide Canada with an effective and modern capability for international operations.”

“A lengthy and intense competition was completed in 2001 for who would build the F-35,” said the Honourable Rona Ambrose, Minister of Public Works and Government Services and Minister for Status of Women. “Canadian companies and the Canadian government helped develop the F-35, and now we are exercising our option under the Joint Strike Fighter memorandum of understanding to acquire it.”

“Canadian participation in the Joint Strike Fighter program will bring high-value jobs and other economic benefits to our country,” said Jacques Gourde, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services and to the Minister of National Revenue and Member of Parliament for Lotbinière-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière.  “This government is delivering on our plan to strengthen Canada’s defence industry, leverage Canada’s competitive advantage and work with industry to help position Canadian companies for success in the global marketplace.”

The Government of Canada has committed approximately $9 billion to the acquisition of 65 F-35 aircraft and associated weapons, infrastructure, initial spares, training simulators, contingency funds and project operating costs. Delivery of the new aircraft is expected to start in 2016.

To date, Canada has invested approximately $168 million in the Joint Strike Fighter program. Since 2002, the Government’s participation in the program has led to more than $350 million in contracts for more than 85 Canadian companies, research laboratories, and universities – a clear demonstration of the significant benefits this program has for Canada.

“The Joint Strike Fighter program allows Canadian companies to build on existing strengths and establish strategic capabilities,” said the Honourable Tony Clement, Minister of Industry. “Canadian companies will have direct involvement in the design of equipment in the short term, while also setting in motion opportunities for decades to come.”

The Canada First Defence Strategy identifies Canada’s need for a next generation fighter aircraft to protect the safety and security of Canadians, while supporting foreign policy and national security objectives. The acquisition of the F-35 helps the Canadian Forces defend against the threats of the 21^st century at home, across vast distances and in harsh environmental conditions, and abroad.

The F-35 Lightning II has been developed by Lockheed Martin and partners through the Joint Strike Fighter program, a multinational effort to build and sustain an affordable, multi-role, next generation stealth fighter aircraft.  Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Norway, and Australia are all partners in the program.

As a partner in the Joint Strike Fighter program since 1997, Canada participated in the extensive and rigorous U.S.-led competitive process, which led to the selection of Lockheed Martin and its partners as the Joint Strike Fighter manufacturer in 2001.

CAS Lieutenant-General André Deschamps’ Appearance Before the Standing Committee on National Defence

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ANDRÉ DESCHAMPS
CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
AND THE SELECTION OF THE F-35 LIGHTNING II

HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
28 OCTOBER 2010

Committee Members

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the high level mandatory capabilities for Canada’s next fighter aircraft.

You recently had the opportunity to hear from Mr. Dan Ross, our Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, concerning the process being used to procure the F-35 as the best-price, best-capability and, thus, best-value fighter for Canadians under the MOU signed by the Joint Strike Fighter program partners. I will therefore focus specifically on Canada’s requirements – and the extensive analysis of options – for the fighter we will use for the next 30 to 40 years.

As I noted previously to this committee, manned fighters are essential to our ability to maintain control and sovereignty over our airspace, whether in Canada or during operations abroad. Neither unmanned aerial vehicles nor any other air platform can carry out this demanding and complex task, whether they are operating in air-to-air or air-to-ground roles.  This is the same conclusion reached by many of Canada’s allies.

Following the announcement of the Government’s intent to acquire a next generation fighter in the Canada First Defence Strategy, we examined our requirements very closely and finalized them in early 2010. We looked at future and current roles and missions that our next generation fighter capability would be responsible for and the environment – physical and threat – in which it would be operating.

We need a capability that helps us carry out our core missions of defending the sovereignty of Canadian and North American airspace through NORAD, providing Canada with an effective and modern capability for international operations, and effectively conducting joint operations with our Allies through NATO or a coalition.

We need robust aircraft, capable of operating across Canada's vast geography and under harsh and varying weather conditions and deterring challenges to Canadian sovereignty.

Because we cannot afford to acquire and operate multiple, specialized fighter fleets, tomorrow’s fighter aircraft must be capable of undertaking multiple roles, which comprise a variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface combat roles. In a more generic sense, the fighter must be capable of undertaking the defence roles we demand of it, whether that is northern sovereignty patrols, intercept roles, war-fighting, surveillance and more.

Furthermore, to be prepared for the future,  the aircraft must be flexible enough to deal with threats and missions that were unexpected at its time of conception.

We know that some of the threats faced by the CF-18 in the late 20th century have faded, some have continued and new ones have emerged.  There is no reason for us to doubt that we will continue to see similar fluidity and evolution in threats as this century unfolds. We assume that technology will continue to evolve on various fronts, such as data processing, threat detection, weapons systems, self-defence suites, and interoperability – to give just a few examples.

Specifically our short list of high level mandatory capabilities, which are qualitative and not quantitative in nature, comprises the following characteristics.

Range:  The aircraft must have the range to be capable of deploying in NORAD and NATO alert configuration, in accordance with instrument flying rules without air-to-air refuelling support, whether the aircraft is flying non-stop from a main operating base to a deployed operating base or from a main operating base to a forward operating location with one stop enroute if required.

Endurance:  The aircraft must have the endurance to be capable of operating from a main operating base, a deployed operating base or a forward operating location in accordance with instrument flying rules and maintain a combat air patrol in accordance with Canadian Forces, NORAD and NATO requirements.

Speed:  Our next fighter must have the speed to be capable of successfully conducting an intercept of air-breathing threats – that is to say, non-ballistic threats such as fighters or bombers – to Canadian airspace or to airspace assigned to the Canadian Forces in accordance with NORAD and NATO standards.

Air-to-Air Refuelling:  The fighter must be capable of receiving fuel in-flight to extend its range and endurance.

Deployability:  Our next fighter must be capable of deploying to and operating from  forward operating locations domestically and worldwide in a full range of geographic, environmental, climatic and threat conditions.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance:  The fighter must be capable of providing non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data, before, during and following the deployment of weapons.  This capability will assist targeting, intelligence and command entities in a variety of decision-making processes.

Weapons:  The aircraft must precisely deliver a range of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons in all weather conditions, day and night, and in permissive and non-permissive environments to provide a spectrum of tailored weapons effects.

Survivability:  The aircraft must be capable of defending itself by employing a range of self-defence technologies and minimizing the risk of detection, engagement and damage in predicted threat environments.

Growth Potential:  The aircraft must be capable of continuous upgrade to its level of interoperability, survivability and operational capabilities for the duration of its lifetime.

Fleet Size:  The fleet must be large enough to conduct assigned missions and roles while simultaneously maintaining combat-ready force generation capability (that is, training new crews and maintenance of aircraft).

Certification:  The aircraft must be capable of certifcation and sustainment in accordance with Canadian standards.

Delivery:  The delivery times must give us the capability of achieving an initial operating capability of the new aircraft coordinated with the CF-188 Hornet’s end of lifetime. In other words, the new fighter must begin delivery in 2016 to allow overlap with the Hornet’s projected retirement in 2020 and thus avoid a gap in our defence capabilities by ensuring that such needs as trained crews are are ready to go. In procurement terms, that is almost tomorrow! 

The analysis of the quantitative mandatory requirements associated with these high-level mandatory capabilities for Canada’s next fighter made it clear that only a 5th generation fighter could satisfy our mission needs in the increasingly complex future security environment.

The F-35 Lightning II is the only aircraft that meets our mandatory requirements and the only 5th generation aircraft available to Canada.  The 5th generation F-22 Raptor is an excellent air superiority fighter that is being upgraded through the addition of selected capabilities that have their origin in the F-35, but the United States government does not permit foreign sales. Russia has a 5th generation under development, and China is expected to do the same.

Three key capabilities distinguish a 5th generation fighter from a 4th generation:

First, interoperability – a unique combination of stealth, long-range high resolution sensors and secure high-capacity networks that allow aircraft to communicate with one another and share data in a secure environment.

Secondly, sensors and data fusion – a system that consolidates tactical information from the sensors and off-board sources to provide pilots with a clear understanding of the tactical situation at a glance.

And, thirdly, survivability – that is very low observable stealth, advanced sensors, a comprehensive self-defence suite, and secure data-link that mean a 5th generation aircraft can accomplish more in a mission with fewer supporting assets.

It is important to be clear that a 4th generation aircraft cannot be upgraded to a 5th generation aircraft. You cannot turn a 4th generation CF-18, even a modernized version such as ours, into a 5th generation stealth aircraft.]

The F-35 Lightning II represents a revolutionary difference from previous generations of fighters in terms of capabilities, and it brings unique advantages.

It brings stealth technology – low observability – that will significantly reduce the aircraft’s electromagnetic signature and therefore reduce detection by enemy sensor systems. It provides lower risk and improved survivability for the pilot as well as enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities – all of which have significant relevance across the Government of Canada’s defence priorities of national, continental and international operations.

It possesses advanced sensor and data fusion technology that will gather, synthesize and display information to help pilots understand the tactical situation at a glance, make complex tactical decisions quickly, and take decisive action. The aircraft takes care of much of the data gathering and synthesis that pilots now have to do themselves, and which has become almost overwhelming in its quantity and speed. In effect, the aircraft is the co-pilot.

We will have interoperability with our partners and Allies that will be seamless, safe and effective within NORAD and NATO and on coalition operations.

The F-35 allows us to share its entire situational awareness with partner aircraft. When we go into operations abroad with coalition like-minded nations with the same platform, the aircraft are the same. Therefore, we can share resources and quickly go into an operation without weeks of training because we have the same kit and software as our partners. It makes a big difference in how we’re going to do business as a coalition.

Furthermore, the aircraft is sustainable. We will be able to replace lost aircraft – or acquire additional aircraft if the future global situation demands it – because the production line will operate until at least 2035.

Software will be upgraded on an ongoing basis and we will not have to contract individually for upgrades, bringing huge savings and keeping the aircraft up to date as technology evolves.

In conclusion, given the increasingly complex and uncertain future security environment, the F-35 Lightning II will provide Canada with the greatest probability of mission success and the greatest probability that our men and women will survive and return safely from their missions.

We are acquiring the F-35 Lightning II to protect Canadian interests and to counter tomorrow’s threats. Procured and sustained through the JSF Program, the F-35 is the best value for our taxpayer dollar, and will keep Canada at the forefront of fighter operations – enabling our fleet to remain relevant, flexible, viable and sustainable well into the middle of this century.

The F-35 Lightning II is not an unnecessary luxury. It is the right tool, at the best value, to properly do the job that Canada and Canadians want their Air Force to carry out on their behalf.

Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen. I would be happy to address any questions you have about the high level mandatory capabilities for our next generation fighter.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/2/pro-pro/ngfc-fs-ft/notes-eng.asp