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Sunday, September 18, 2011

122 Generals and few with combat or even operational experience


There are 122 general officers in DND and with staff levels of about 10 to 12 per each officer you begin to get the idea of where the bloat is.
Now ask how many have combat experience or even experience on deployed operations be it NORAD, NATO or an operation like Libya.

1 Bangladesh10,736
2 Pakistan10,691
3 India8,935
4 Nigeria5,709
5 Egypt5,458
6 Nepal5,044
7 Jordan3,826
8 Ghana3,647
9 Rwanda3,635
10 Uruguay2,489
11 Ethiopia2,391
12 Brazil2,269
13 Senegal2,254
14 South Africa2,088
15 China1,995
16 Italy1,866
17 France1,771
18 Indonesia1,691
19 Morocco1,561
20 Sri Lanka1,157
21 Spain1,109
22 Malaysia1,080
23 Benin1,028
24 Philippines1,024
25 Argentina1,023
26 Tanzania1,011
27 Burkina Faso927
28 Kenya870
29 Zambia768
30 Togo738
31 Turkey664
32 South Korea643
33 Niger577
34 Chile538
35 Gambia522
36 Mongolia426
37 Peru396
38 Austria393
39 Ukraine366
40 Russia362
41 Portugal337
42 Guatemala320
43 Sierra Leone311
44 Germany293
45 United Kingdom281
46 Japan266
47 Fiji263
48 Bolivia259
49 Yemen211
50 Canada200
There are only 200 Canadian service personnel on UN operations around the world...... yet we have 122 generals.
File:CADPAT AR.jpg
For operations in Afghanistan there will be a total of 950 specialized personnel training the ANSF

Has this issue been brought up before?
Chris Wattie   
National Post  

Wednesday, December 03, 2003

The Canadian Forces face dire, even terminal, consequences after decades of government neglect and underfunding, but a comprehensive new report on the future of Canada‘s military has also concluded more money is not the answer.

"About half of the defence budget is spent on military capability related to operations and the remainder on various managerial activities," said the 125-page report by researchers at Queen‘s University and the Conference of Defence Associations.

"Even though the Canadian Forces has been reduced by 50% over the last 40 years, overhead (measured as the increase in supervisory groups) has increased in the same time frame by 300%."

The Canadian military is overburdened with generals and senior staff officers and a structure that is three decades out of date, the report said.

"National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), designed in 1972 to meet Cold War commitments and the demands of the Ottawa officialdom, remained essentially unchanged in structure throughout the 1990s."

Canada‘s military has long been criticized for its high ratio of generals and senior officers to privates and corporals, and the paper concludes the Canadian Forces also needs a top-to-bottom overhaul of its structure, "a huge redistribution of the resources allocated to national defence and the Canadian Forces, and a reordering of attitudes as well."

However, the authors of "Canada Without Armed Forces?" conclude: "Even in the best of circumstances, it might take many years before this transformation is fully effective."

Colonel Howard Marsh, a retired army officer and co-author of the study, said inefficiency and orders imposed by politicians waste "perhaps 40 to 50%" of the defence budget.

For example, the study says the military‘s training system is too often forced to deal with ad hoc recruiting drives that deliver more new soldiers, sailors and airmen than it can handle.

This May, for example, there were 7,872 troops awaiting or receiving training. "Given that the recruiters are annually pumping 5,000-6,000 candidates into an individual training system that was downsized in the 1990s to handle fewer than 3,000 trainees a year, one should not be surprised to discover that thousands of paid but unqualified ... people are waiting to begin or to complete [basic] training," the study notes.

But in addition to increased funding, more troops and newer equipment, the study also calls for wholesale changes to the way new weapons and vehicles are purchased.

Col. Marsh, a former senior army planner, is scathing in his analysis of the military‘s purchasing programs, which eat up scarce defence dollars by requiring equipment be bought at a premium from certain Canadian manufacturers.

He cites the example of the army‘s heavy, medium and light trucks, including the ageing Iltis jeep-type vehicles, which were purchased from manufacturers in B.C., Ontario and Quebec.

"The Department of National Defence paid an exorbitant premium for these regionally manufactured trucks, a premium estimated at 250% of the original manufacturers‘ retail price. In other words, the DND should have obtained twice the number of vehicles for the same price, or paid half as much for what it got."

The pattern of "regional development strategies imposed on DND by Cabinet" make such equipment more expensive to operate, as spare parts must eventually be ordered from the original foreign manufacturer.

And the study notes that buying even the simplest pieces of kit require years of study and requisitioning.

"Acquiring equipment and bringing it to operational standards require a minimum of eight to 12 years," the study said. "Even the seemingly straightforward project to replace combat clothing started in 1992 and was not completed by 2002."

One of the most serious shortcomings, according to the study, is the absence of an up-to-date plan for the future of the military.

The study notes that since the last Defence White Paper was issued in 1994, the international scene has changed dramatically -- particularly since Sept. 11, 2001.

"But so far as research into public records and other primary sources reveal, no Canadian review of the implications of this strategy on Canada‘s defence situation has been conducted in Ottawa.

"Certainly, the realities of what some Americans now call ‘the Fourth World War‘ have not caused Canadian ministers to spring to the garrison‘s walls."


© Copyright 2003 National Post

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